Thomas J. Scheff
Scheff argues, in this chapter, that both shame and denial of shame are ingrained in our civilization, and that this denial must be usurped by the introduction of a wider emotional language that allows for more nuanced emotional expression, such as that of shame.
Scheff frames shame, and its counterpart pride, as integral parts of social bonds, at one point in his article classifying the fear of shame as "social fear," citing especially the work of Cooley, who explores shame in human interaction, particularly physiological phenomena such as the lowering of the eyes and blushing at the occurrence of shame.
Scheff discusses what he calls "shame cultures" and "guilt cultures," positing shame as characteristic of traditional, non-Western societies, while guilt cultures are modern, industrialized societies. Both shame and guilt are used for "social control" in their respective civilizations (210). Our aggressive denial of shame in modern society has led to a sort of double shame - in shameful situations, we feel the immediate shame but also the shame at feeling shame, an emotion that seems so forbidden in modern society.
This awareness of the inappropriate nature of the emotion of shame emerges in a tendency toward "impression management" (210: citing Goffman 1959), or a constant attempt to control the self that is presented to others, even others the self does not consider important. This tendency obviously increases the likelihood of shame states in our daily lives. Interestingly, Scheff points out a similar tendency to feel shame at experiences of pride emotions (219).
Scheff concludes his article with a discussion of how guilt usurped shame in modern societies. Her ultimate conclusion is that as family structures change in a modernizing society, the culture becomes more characterized by isolation. As such, with the intersubjective focus of shame discussed throughout this course material, social regulation by the group becomes less effective.
Scheff points to an institutionalization of "the myth of individualism," and the above mentioned turning away of pride and shame with this isolation, as "defenses against the pain of threatened bonds" (224). This process of rejecting the rejector reflects the anger that accompanies shame.
The cultural focus in this article draws a parallel to the two chapters discussed in previous posts from Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity; this article's focus on societies' experience of shame versus that of the individuals nods to a similar focus with regards to trauma in the previously discussed chapters.
Thursday, June 24, 2010
Shame, Narcissism, and Intersubjectivity
Andrew P. Morrison and Robert D. Stolorow
Beginning their article by defining narcissism as the yearning for uniqueness in the eyes of an idealized other, and a yearning to be the most important person to that other, Morrison and Stolorow endeavor to widen the understanding and definition of narcissism in the psychoanalytic context.
In following with Freud, the authors associate narcissism with infancy, pointing to the event of the infant's differentiation as an individual as the primary rupturing of this narcissism. The important point to take from this section of the article, however, is the authors' assertion that shame lies at the core of this derailment of the narcissistic experience.
The authors devote much of their chapter to a discussion of narcissism's path through the history of psychoanalysis, discussing not only Freud's views on the phenomenon but also Jung's, Adler's, and less well-known names.
With a discussion of two narcissistic states - feelings of worthlessness and smallness versus feelings of "expansive grandiosity," or egotistic versus dissociative, (Morrison's "dialectic of narcissism") the authors transition into a discussion of the "ideal self," and, by extension, the ego and the ego-ideal (67). Continuing their discussion of narcissism's history, the authors go on to further discuss the theories of other analysts', particularly the work of Helen Block Lewis (see earlier posts on her work) and her theory of bypassed shame.
The following half of the article is, if possible, more dense and confusing than the first. I need to do a closer reading, as at this point I cannot really effectively write it up!
The final section of the article is entitled "The Intersubjective Contexts of Shame," echoing the title.
Beginning their article by defining narcissism as the yearning for uniqueness in the eyes of an idealized other, and a yearning to be the most important person to that other, Morrison and Stolorow endeavor to widen the understanding and definition of narcissism in the psychoanalytic context.
In following with Freud, the authors associate narcissism with infancy, pointing to the event of the infant's differentiation as an individual as the primary rupturing of this narcissism. The important point to take from this section of the article, however, is the authors' assertion that shame lies at the core of this derailment of the narcissistic experience.
The authors devote much of their chapter to a discussion of narcissism's path through the history of psychoanalysis, discussing not only Freud's views on the phenomenon but also Jung's, Adler's, and less well-known names.
With a discussion of two narcissistic states - feelings of worthlessness and smallness versus feelings of "expansive grandiosity," or egotistic versus dissociative, (Morrison's "dialectic of narcissism") the authors transition into a discussion of the "ideal self," and, by extension, the ego and the ego-ideal (67). Continuing their discussion of narcissism's history, the authors go on to further discuss the theories of other analysts', particularly the work of Helen Block Lewis (see earlier posts on her work) and her theory of bypassed shame.
The following half of the article is, if possible, more dense and confusing than the first. I need to do a closer reading, as at this point I cannot really effectively write it up!
The final section of the article is entitled "The Intersubjective Contexts of Shame," echoing the title.
Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity Chapter 2
"Psychological Trauma and Cultural Trauma"
Neil J. Smelser
This chapter is devoted, as its title would suggest, to mapping the intersections between psychological and cultural traumas, focusing especially on the trauma experience as both an event and its accompanying context. Smelser argues that Freud, too, understood trama as growing from this relationship, although he says this can be hard to derive from his work.
From here, Smelser begins to tackle the idea of cultural trauma, translating his idea of trauma as an event plus context to the national scale. Smelser argues that there is no certainty that any event will become a trauma, despite how violent it may be, and that the range of events that can qualify as cultural traumas is vast and varied.
At this point, Smelser qualifies his statement with specifics. Citing the sociocultural context of an event, the production of memory and its association with a particular affect ["usually disgust, shame, or guilt (36)], and the time at which it is remembered, be it days, months, decades, or centuries, Smelser concludes that "cultural traumas are for the most part historically made, not born" (37).
Further, Smelser contends that a chief factor in the production of trauma is a massive disruption in the stable social system, which is "classified along functional lines," including economic, legal, medical, educational institutions, etc. (37). However, these disruptions are subjective. Smelser identifies "carrier groups," influential individuals and groups, that enforce the idea that a trauma has occurred, and work to memorialize it.
Essential factors of a cultural trauma, Smelser writes, are its duel statuses as both indelible and ingrained on the national psyche, and as such, its assimilation into the group's national collective identity. Beginning here with a discussion of defense and coping mechanisms (45), Smelser postulates that "collective memory work," the work done by carrier groups in trauma memory production, is essential in collective coping because it frames the 'traumatic' event as affecting the entire collective, indirectly if not directly.
Smelser closes his chapter with a discussion of ambivalence surrounding trauma. Memorials, he claims, can be considered paradoxical in their intents to both remember the event, but to have the done the work of mourning in the construction of the monument. As such, the trauma is both left open and slammed closed. As the chapter ends, Smelser warns the readers of the ever widening opportunities for trauma in an increasingly globalized world.
*definition of cultural trauma 44
Neil J. Smelser
This chapter is devoted, as its title would suggest, to mapping the intersections between psychological and cultural traumas, focusing especially on the trauma experience as both an event and its accompanying context. Smelser argues that Freud, too, understood trama as growing from this relationship, although he says this can be hard to derive from his work.
From here, Smelser begins to tackle the idea of cultural trauma, translating his idea of trauma as an event plus context to the national scale. Smelser argues that there is no certainty that any event will become a trauma, despite how violent it may be, and that the range of events that can qualify as cultural traumas is vast and varied.
At this point, Smelser qualifies his statement with specifics. Citing the sociocultural context of an event, the production of memory and its association with a particular affect ["usually disgust, shame, or guilt (36)], and the time at which it is remembered, be it days, months, decades, or centuries, Smelser concludes that "cultural traumas are for the most part historically made, not born" (37).
Further, Smelser contends that a chief factor in the production of trauma is a massive disruption in the stable social system, which is "classified along functional lines," including economic, legal, medical, educational institutions, etc. (37). However, these disruptions are subjective. Smelser identifies "carrier groups," influential individuals and groups, that enforce the idea that a trauma has occurred, and work to memorialize it.
Essential factors of a cultural trauma, Smelser writes, are its duel statuses as both indelible and ingrained on the national psyche, and as such, its assimilation into the group's national collective identity. Beginning here with a discussion of defense and coping mechanisms (45), Smelser postulates that "collective memory work," the work done by carrier groups in trauma memory production, is essential in collective coping because it frames the 'traumatic' event as affecting the entire collective, indirectly if not directly.
Smelser closes his chapter with a discussion of ambivalence surrounding trauma. Memorials, he claims, can be considered paradoxical in their intents to both remember the event, but to have the done the work of mourning in the construction of the monument. As such, the trauma is both left open and slammed closed. As the chapter ends, Smelser warns the readers of the ever widening opportunities for trauma in an increasingly globalized world.
*definition of cultural trauma 44
Sunday, June 20, 2010
Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity Chapter 1
"Toward a Theory of Cultural Trauma"
Jeffrey C. Alexander
In this chapter, which serves as an introduction to Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, Alexander posits a theory of trauma intended to break away from what he calls “lay trauma theory” – a school of thought he separates into two schools, enlightenment and psychoanalytic.
The enlightenment school of lay trauma theory, Alexander writes, is useful for its collective emphasis, positing experiences of trauma as existing within a forward-moving social order. Indeed, according to the author, enlightenment trauma theory sees trauma as a positive social force. The occurrence of trauma, the theory posits, will lead to innovation and change. Improved economies following wars are used as evidence for this theory. Alexander calls this thinking “realist” (5).
The psychoanalytic understanding of trauma, on the other hand, remains individually based and is largely informed by theories of repression. In this section Alexander mentions the work of Cathy Caruth, another author featured on the course syllabus. Alexander conceptualizes psychoanalytic trauma theory as depending on a Freudian definition of trauma as arising from the unexpected, and truly manifesting itself in the haunting after effect of not knowing, and not expecting, what has happened.
Alexander classifies both approaches as “naturalistic.” By this, he means that both theories rely on an understanding that the type of trauma experienced is informed by the type of event. Alexander devotes his introduction to arguing that the type of trauma that occurs, and how it is consumed by a society, is informed not by the event but by a trauma process. Specifically, Alexander asserts that trauma does not arise from events themselves because no event can be inherently traumatic. Rather, trauma is “socially mediated,” and can arise from occurrences that never, in fact, took place (8).
Alexander goes on to identify the “social process of cultural trauma,” claiming that an event becomes traumatic as certain agents, members of “carrier groups,” work to ingrain that trauma into the collective identity. Questions must be brought forth as to the nature of the pain caused by the event, the nature of the victim, the relation of that victim to the wider group, and how that relationship and the event itself is then consumed by different “institutional areas.” Considering religious, aesthetic, legal, scientific, mass media, state bureaucracy, and stratificational hierarchies, Alexander goes into the questions raised in these specific groups and communities, and how this informs trauma’s entrance into the collective identity.
Ultimately, the experience of trauma can take place. Alexander calls this a “sociological process,” consisting of the definition of a painful injury, the establishment of a victim, attribution of responsibility, and distribution of the ideal and material consequences (22). This process, he continues, leads to relief, both in the public and private sphere.
Concluding his introduction with an assertion that trauma is a topic of interest in both Western and non-Western nations, Alexander posits that failure to recognize collective traumas by not participating in the trauma process leads to a lack of emergence of “lessons into collective identity” (26). Closing, Alexander emphasizes that the theory he has laid out is not simply "technical and scientific," but rather that is it "normatively relevant," and can inform trauma processes to ultimate "moral-practical action."
Jeffrey C. Alexander
In this chapter, which serves as an introduction to Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity, Alexander posits a theory of trauma intended to break away from what he calls “lay trauma theory” – a school of thought he separates into two schools, enlightenment and psychoanalytic.
The enlightenment school of lay trauma theory, Alexander writes, is useful for its collective emphasis, positing experiences of trauma as existing within a forward-moving social order. Indeed, according to the author, enlightenment trauma theory sees trauma as a positive social force. The occurrence of trauma, the theory posits, will lead to innovation and change. Improved economies following wars are used as evidence for this theory. Alexander calls this thinking “realist” (5).
The psychoanalytic understanding of trauma, on the other hand, remains individually based and is largely informed by theories of repression. In this section Alexander mentions the work of Cathy Caruth, another author featured on the course syllabus. Alexander conceptualizes psychoanalytic trauma theory as depending on a Freudian definition of trauma as arising from the unexpected, and truly manifesting itself in the haunting after effect of not knowing, and not expecting, what has happened.
Alexander classifies both approaches as “naturalistic.” By this, he means that both theories rely on an understanding that the type of trauma experienced is informed by the type of event. Alexander devotes his introduction to arguing that the type of trauma that occurs, and how it is consumed by a society, is informed not by the event but by a trauma process. Specifically, Alexander asserts that trauma does not arise from events themselves because no event can be inherently traumatic. Rather, trauma is “socially mediated,” and can arise from occurrences that never, in fact, took place (8).
Alexander goes on to identify the “social process of cultural trauma,” claiming that an event becomes traumatic as certain agents, members of “carrier groups,” work to ingrain that trauma into the collective identity. Questions must be brought forth as to the nature of the pain caused by the event, the nature of the victim, the relation of that victim to the wider group, and how that relationship and the event itself is then consumed by different “institutional areas.” Considering religious, aesthetic, legal, scientific, mass media, state bureaucracy, and stratificational hierarchies, Alexander goes into the questions raised in these specific groups and communities, and how this informs trauma’s entrance into the collective identity.
Ultimately, the experience of trauma can take place. Alexander calls this a “sociological process,” consisting of the definition of a painful injury, the establishment of a victim, attribution of responsibility, and distribution of the ideal and material consequences (22). This process, he continues, leads to relief, both in the public and private sphere.
Concluding his introduction with an assertion that trauma is a topic of interest in both Western and non-Western nations, Alexander posits that failure to recognize collective traumas by not participating in the trauma process leads to a lack of emergence of “lessons into collective identity” (26). Closing, Alexander emphasizes that the theory he has laid out is not simply "technical and scientific," but rather that is it "normatively relevant," and can inform trauma processes to ultimate "moral-practical action."
Thursday, June 17, 2010
Mourning and Melancholia
Sigmund Freud
In this chapter, Freud attempts to use the paradigm of mourning in order to understand and conceptualize melancholia, a condition that we would today call depression. Framing both mourning and melancholia in terms of loss of a loved object, Freud differentiates the two by identifying the loss in muorning as conscious, while the loss of a love-object in those experiencing melancholia can be unconscious, and can include not only a person but a wider definition of the love-object.
Perhaps the most significant factor of melancholia, as opposed to mourning, is the drawing in of the libido. In both conditions the idea of re-assigning the libido in the instance of the loss of the original object is undesirable, and both conditions, Freud claims, eventually pass leaving no trace. However, specific to melancholia, the libido instead turns in on the ego of the sufferer. During this process, identification takes place. In other words, as the libido is turned inward, the melancholic creates in her own ego a shadow of the lost love-object, a process that makes the reassignment of the libido onto another external object impossible, and also one that assures the internal attacking upon the self of the melancholic. Freud writes, "In grief the world becomes poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself"(167).
Freud goes on to further classify the state of melancholia, on its own and in conversation with grief and mourning. Significantly, Freud states that shame is a state absent in melancholia, replaced with a desire to speak and disparage the self. However, he highlights "an extraordinary fall in [the melancholic's] self-esteem, an impoverishment in his ego on a grand scale" (167). This sentiment expresses a sort of self-hatred characteristic of a working definition of shame presented in previous posts and readings on contemporary shame theory.
Significantly, Freud does not fall into the trap he is said to fall into in contemporary readings critical of his lack of attention to shame in his writings - that is, he does not misidentify shame as guilt. Indeed he makes no mention of guilt in this chapter, seeming to conceptualize melancholia as a condition separate from both shame and guilt. I would argue, however, that the level of turning against the ego described by Freud in this work does detail shame, and perhaps that a detailed look into shame instances in the patients he describes would help to assuage the sentiments of melancholia.
Near the end of the chapter, Freud discusses mania. The lifting of the states of mourning and melancholia, which, as mentioned above, Freud claims occurs after an unspecified time, is not accompanied with any degree of mania expected to accompany such a change. Rather, since the two states are so characteristically slow to change, this mania is absent.
Freud closes his chapter explicitly identifying the three conditions he has discussed for melancholia - loss of an object, ambivalence, and the regression of the libido into the ego. His discussion of ambivilance is a bit confusing. What I have taken from it is that ambivilance in the melancholic (and the mourner) exists as the afflicted experiences fury towards, and associates a lowering of the value of, their lost love-object.
In this chapter, Freud attempts to use the paradigm of mourning in order to understand and conceptualize melancholia, a condition that we would today call depression. Framing both mourning and melancholia in terms of loss of a loved object, Freud differentiates the two by identifying the loss in muorning as conscious, while the loss of a love-object in those experiencing melancholia can be unconscious, and can include not only a person but a wider definition of the love-object.
Perhaps the most significant factor of melancholia, as opposed to mourning, is the drawing in of the libido. In both conditions the idea of re-assigning the libido in the instance of the loss of the original object is undesirable, and both conditions, Freud claims, eventually pass leaving no trace. However, specific to melancholia, the libido instead turns in on the ego of the sufferer. During this process, identification takes place. In other words, as the libido is turned inward, the melancholic creates in her own ego a shadow of the lost love-object, a process that makes the reassignment of the libido onto another external object impossible, and also one that assures the internal attacking upon the self of the melancholic. Freud writes, "In grief the world becomes poor and empty; in melancholia it is the ego itself"(167).
Freud goes on to further classify the state of melancholia, on its own and in conversation with grief and mourning. Significantly, Freud states that shame is a state absent in melancholia, replaced with a desire to speak and disparage the self. However, he highlights "an extraordinary fall in [the melancholic's] self-esteem, an impoverishment in his ego on a grand scale" (167). This sentiment expresses a sort of self-hatred characteristic of a working definition of shame presented in previous posts and readings on contemporary shame theory.
Significantly, Freud does not fall into the trap he is said to fall into in contemporary readings critical of his lack of attention to shame in his writings - that is, he does not misidentify shame as guilt. Indeed he makes no mention of guilt in this chapter, seeming to conceptualize melancholia as a condition separate from both shame and guilt. I would argue, however, that the level of turning against the ego described by Freud in this work does detail shame, and perhaps that a detailed look into shame instances in the patients he describes would help to assuage the sentiments of melancholia.
Near the end of the chapter, Freud discusses mania. The lifting of the states of mourning and melancholia, which, as mentioned above, Freud claims occurs after an unspecified time, is not accompanied with any degree of mania expected to accompany such a change. Rather, since the two states are so characteristically slow to change, this mania is absent.
Freud closes his chapter explicitly identifying the three conditions he has discussed for melancholia - loss of an object, ambivalence, and the regression of the libido into the ego. His discussion of ambivilance is a bit confusing. What I have taken from it is that ambivilance in the melancholic (and the mourner) exists as the afflicted experiences fury towards, and associates a lowering of the value of, their lost love-object.
Tuesday, June 15, 2010
The Legacy of Freud's Writings on Shame
Lansky and Morrison
The goal of the article seems to be to identify the ways in which Freud's writings failed to appropriately deal with shame, and the ways in which recognition of shame could act as a unifying force in the psychoanalytic community.
The authors point to three ways Freud uses shame in his study: shame as a motive for defense, shame as a method of defense, and shame in relation to ideals and aspirations.
Shame functions as a motive for defense when patients do not want to access painful memories, and those incompatible with continued approval of the self by others. As such, shame leads to voluntary concealment, or the active avoidance of shame. Alternatively, shame as a method of defense acts as a safeguard, ensuring that we act in a socially appropriate manner in order to avoid the unpleasant emotion of shame.*
These uses, the article argues, represent a "mechanization of shame." In other words, he uses shame to hold only specific functions in his work, and as such eliminates the varied sources of shame. One of these such places is narcissism. This section was rather dense and I need to go over it again.
The following section details Freud's descriptions of four of his dreams, identifying that they all occurred on nights following days in which Freud experienced particularly humiliating or shameful occurrences. This section, I feel, is a weak point of the article. After devoting the beginning of their article to a discussion of Freud's misuse of the concept of guilt to encompass experiences that were actually shameful, Lansky and Morrison use a wide definition of shame in this section, including examples that could also be identified as irritating or frustrating, rather than humiliating.
*This is confusing to me. My notes say "so the fear is the motive, and the avoidance is the method?"
The goal of the article seems to be to identify the ways in which Freud's writings failed to appropriately deal with shame, and the ways in which recognition of shame could act as a unifying force in the psychoanalytic community.
The authors point to three ways Freud uses shame in his study: shame as a motive for defense, shame as a method of defense, and shame in relation to ideals and aspirations.
Shame functions as a motive for defense when patients do not want to access painful memories, and those incompatible with continued approval of the self by others. As such, shame leads to voluntary concealment, or the active avoidance of shame. Alternatively, shame as a method of defense acts as a safeguard, ensuring that we act in a socially appropriate manner in order to avoid the unpleasant emotion of shame.*
These uses, the article argues, represent a "mechanization of shame." In other words, he uses shame to hold only specific functions in his work, and as such eliminates the varied sources of shame. One of these such places is narcissism. This section was rather dense and I need to go over it again.
The following section details Freud's descriptions of four of his dreams, identifying that they all occurred on nights following days in which Freud experienced particularly humiliating or shameful occurrences. This section, I feel, is a weak point of the article. After devoting the beginning of their article to a discussion of Freud's misuse of the concept of guilt to encompass experiences that were actually shameful, Lansky and Morrison use a wide definition of shame in this section, including examples that could also be identified as irritating or frustrating, rather than humiliating.
*This is confusing to me. My notes say "so the fear is the motive, and the avoidance is the method?"
The Role of Shame in Depression Over the Life Span
Helen Block Lewis
In this chapter, Lewis devotes space to the discussion of the "humiliated fury" said to accompany shame. Lewis frames this progression as fury directed at the loss of love, and the accompanying loss of self-esteem, occurring in the Other's rejection of the Self. Lewis identifies humiliated fury and shame as communicative as well as emotional states. Further, she highlights that guilt is a logical state following humiliated fury.
The chapter goes on to look into depression theories, explaining the Bibring theory of depression, which envisions depression as a reaction to helplessness. A primary cause of depression in this theory is the ego being unable to maintain a position of being loved in the eyes of the Self and the Other. Notably, this follows a similar trajectory of her earlier shame narrative.
It is important for analysts to communicate with patients on their own terms, Lewis writes. This means, for example, that if a patient thinks she is possessed by the devil, then it is not useful for the analyst to tell the patient that this is impossible, but rather to ask the patient if she knows how this happened, and to negotiate on these terms a solution from this torment.
In this chapter, Lewis devotes space to the discussion of the "humiliated fury" said to accompany shame. Lewis frames this progression as fury directed at the loss of love, and the accompanying loss of self-esteem, occurring in the Other's rejection of the Self. Lewis identifies humiliated fury and shame as communicative as well as emotional states. Further, she highlights that guilt is a logical state following humiliated fury.
The chapter goes on to look into depression theories, explaining the Bibring theory of depression, which envisions depression as a reaction to helplessness. A primary cause of depression in this theory is the ego being unable to maintain a position of being loved in the eyes of the Self and the Other. Notably, this follows a similar trajectory of her earlier shame narrative.
It is important for analysts to communicate with patients on their own terms, Lewis writes. This means, for example, that if a patient thinks she is possessed by the devil, then it is not useful for the analyst to tell the patient that this is impossible, but rather to ask the patient if she knows how this happened, and to negotiate on these terms a solution from this torment.
Shame: The "Sleeper" in Psychopathology
Helen Block Lewis
In this chapter, Lewis goes into the ways shame is not addressed in psychoanalysis, making a case for why this failure limits the field. Lewis points to a trend of substituting guilt for shame in analysis, which she says leads to misdiagnosis.
Lewis points out that Freud's original theory of seduction allowed for a more in depth consideration of shame than his later writings on fantasy and guilt, which replaced his work in seduction.
Lewis illustrates her experiments in spatial orientation, which led to her theories of field dependent and independent people. She ties these categories to gender socialization, depression, guilt, and shame over the course of this chapter and the next. Women, she writes, are more likely to be field dependent, and also to experience shame and depression. She attributes this to women's inferior social position. Men, she writes, are more likely to be field independent, and experience guilt and paranoia. This is a function of their superior social position and inherent aggression.
Lewis classifies shame as a "vicarious experience" of another's scorn. This idea, which is developed in this reading and further ones, posits shame as a self-conscious phenomenon, a negative emotion that carries a judgment of the self, rather than of an action committed by the self, which is how Lewis classifies guilt. (Lewis, 15). Lewis further ties shame to the loss of affectional bonds or the loss of love.
Question: Lewis calls shame a "wordless" state. I wonder how this can relate to analysis and the "talking cure." Further, as Lewis classifies shame as a state experienced chiefly by women, and women are stereotypically more likely to talk about their feelings, how does this inform shame as a "wordless" state?
In this chapter, Lewis goes into the ways shame is not addressed in psychoanalysis, making a case for why this failure limits the field. Lewis points to a trend of substituting guilt for shame in analysis, which she says leads to misdiagnosis.
Lewis points out that Freud's original theory of seduction allowed for a more in depth consideration of shame than his later writings on fantasy and guilt, which replaced his work in seduction.
Lewis illustrates her experiments in spatial orientation, which led to her theories of field dependent and independent people. She ties these categories to gender socialization, depression, guilt, and shame over the course of this chapter and the next. Women, she writes, are more likely to be field dependent, and also to experience shame and depression. She attributes this to women's inferior social position. Men, she writes, are more likely to be field independent, and experience guilt and paranoia. This is a function of their superior social position and inherent aggression.
Lewis classifies shame as a "vicarious experience" of another's scorn. This idea, which is developed in this reading and further ones, posits shame as a self-conscious phenomenon, a negative emotion that carries a judgment of the self, rather than of an action committed by the self, which is how Lewis classifies guilt. (Lewis, 15). Lewis further ties shame to the loss of affectional bonds or the loss of love.
Question: Lewis calls shame a "wordless" state. I wonder how this can relate to analysis and the "talking cure." Further, as Lewis classifies shame as a state experienced chiefly by women, and women are stereotypically more likely to talk about their feelings, how does this inform shame as a "wordless" state?
Saturday, June 12, 2010
6/12/10
replied to Pat at FHL
emailed B.H. about FHL
checked links on mycourses page - all are functioning except for the one labeled "Freud's study and library," which was a link to the Freud museum which is now dead. New link: http://www.freud.org.uk/
checked OCRA page:
Mourning and Melancholia - good. could be rotated in the original
Assault on Truth - good - this one is supposed to only be the introduction but it also includes the afterword, which is PDFed later. that link doesn't work, and should be removed
Aeitology of Hysteria - good
Shame - the "Sleeper" in Psychopathology - good
The Role of Shame in Depression Over the Lifespan - 2 PDFs, both the same, we could delete one
Lapache Narcissism - good
The Legacy of Freud's Writings on Shame - good
Shame, Narcissism, and Intersubjectivity - good
Shame in Social Theory - good
Writing the Holocaust - good
Mourning and Postmodernity - good
Transgenerational Effects of the Transmission of the Holocaust - good
Intergenerational Memory of the Holocaust - good
NUMBER 100 - TEST - TO BE UPLOADED BY PROFESSOR - not a PDF
Unspeakable Things Unspoken - good
The Science of Child Sexual Abuse - cannot be accessed off the Brown network, accessible on network/with proxy
Letters: The Problem of Child Sexual Abuse - accessible on network/with proxy
Beyond Memory: Child Sexual Abuse and the Statute of Limitations - good
emailed B.H. about FHL
checked links on mycourses page - all are functioning except for the one labeled "Freud's study and library," which was a link to the Freud museum which is now dead. New link: http://www.freud.org.uk/
checked OCRA page:
Mourning and Melancholia - good. could be rotated in the original
Assault on Truth - good - this one is supposed to only be the introduction but it also includes the afterword, which is PDFed later. that link doesn't work, and should be removed
Aeitology of Hysteria - good
Shame - the "Sleeper" in Psychopathology - good
The Role of Shame in Depression Over the Lifespan - 2 PDFs, both the same, we could delete one
Lapache Narcissism - good
The Legacy of Freud's Writings on Shame - good
Shame, Narcissism, and Intersubjectivity - good
Shame in Social Theory - good
Writing the Holocaust - good
Mourning and Postmodernity - good
Transgenerational Effects of the Transmission of the Holocaust - good
Intergenerational Memory of the Holocaust - good
NUMBER 100 - TEST - TO BE UPLOADED BY PROFESSOR - not a PDF
Unspeakable Things Unspoken - good
The Science of Child Sexual Abuse - cannot be accessed off the Brown network, accessible on network/with proxy
Letters: The Problem of Child Sexual Abuse - accessible on network/with proxy
Beyond Memory: Child Sexual Abuse and the Statute of Limitations - good
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